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Dying for the state: the missing just war
question?
ILAN ZVI BARON
Abstract. This article introduces the problem of having to risk one’s life for the state in war,
asking ﬁrst why this question is no longer asked in the just war literature and then
suggesting ﬁve issues that relate to this question: 1) that of individual consent, 2) whether
or not any state can be justiﬁed in obliging its citizens in this regard and whether or not
the type of government is important, 3) whether or not the problem of the obligation diﬀers
between conscript and volunteer armies, 4) the problem of political obligation and how any
individual could be justiﬁably obliged to risk his or her life for the state in war, and 5) the
question of whether a citizen may be obliged to go into any war. The argument is that these
questions are no longer given much attention in the just war literature because of the way
that the concept of proper authority has come to be understood. The article concludes
by suggesting that the problem of the ‘obligation to die’ should be included in our
understanding and use of just war theory and the ethics of war.
Introduction
On 16 December 2008, Frank Gaﬀney, the former Assistant Defense Secretary of
the US, speaking about the war in Iraq and defending the decision to go war and
send over four thousand American soldiers to their deaths, said on national
television, ‘It is regrettable that they had to die, but I believe they did have to die
[. . .] The danger was inaction could have resulted in the death of a great many
more Americans, more than 4000. And that’s the reason I’m still delighted that we
did what we did [. . .]’1 Gaﬀney seems to believe that these soldiers had an
obligation to die – ‘they did have to die’ – but was this obligation just? He tries
to justify their deaths by claiming that they had to die for the greater good, that
a few deaths of American soldiers is preferable to even more deaths of American
citizens. These are highly questionable claims, particularly in light of the war he is
defending. Indeed, how is one to explain the justiﬁability of these deaths when
there is so much doubt over the actual reasons for the war, the costs of the war
and its justiﬁability? If the war was unjustiﬁed, was the state justiﬁed in sending so
many soldiers to their deaths? What if the war was justiﬁed? Does it matter that
those who died were voluntary enlistees and not conscripted soldiers? What about
those who enlisted, and their access to making an informed choice about the need
for this war and thus of signing up for dangerous duty? While the death toll of
American soldiers in Iraq has led to signiﬁcant moral outrage in the US, it is
1 MSNBC Hardball with Chris Mathews, 16 December 2008.
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unclear how to incorporate this moral discourse into our understanding of the
ethics of war or of the justiﬁability of this particular war. During the Vietnam War,
the combination of an unpopular war and a national draft encouraged political
theorists to evaluate the problem of being sent into war. In this climate, Michael
Walzer wrote the seminal article on the subject, ‘The Obligation to Die’.2 Since
then there has been remarkably little analysis of the moral (and political) issues
that involve either the ability of the state to justiﬁably oblige its citizens to risk
their lives on its behalf, or the justiﬁability of risking one’s life for the state or its
equivalent by being sent into war.3 The silence in the ethics of war literature on
this subject is all the more surprising as the United States has found itself in
another unpopular war, this time joined by the UK, in Iraq and many Nato
countries are ﬁghting another war in Afghanistan. It is all the more intriguing that
the justiﬁability of this obligation has not been addressed considering the lengths
to which the Bush Administration has tried to hide from view the coﬃns and
funerals of American soldiers who died in Iraq.4 Clearly the Bush Administration
realised the potential moral fallout they could suﬀer by allowing the public to see
the death toll of the war, a lesson they may have learned from the Vietnam War.
To be clear, at issue is not a general obligation to military service but an
obligation to do so in war and be faced with risking one’s life in the process. Indeed,
it was on this point that Peter Paret calls for analysis of the obligation that Walzer
called, with rhetorical ﬂourish, the obligation to die.5 The obligation to die is not
really an obligation to die but an obligation to be sent into harms way in war. In
this regard, Walzer notes that there is a diﬀerence between ‘risking one’s life in war
[and] losing it [. . .]’6 The diﬀerence is one of risk, but since Walzer is concerned with
the moral problem of actually losing one’s life in war the issue of risk is irrelevant
to his argument. Yet, the risk factor may suggest that the problem is not really
about obligation but of risk. However, while calculating the morality of dying
according to risk analysis could mitigate the morality of being sent into harm’s way,
it does not by itself provide a justiﬁcation for being in that situation in the ﬁrst
place. As it is used here, the term the obligation to die is shorthand and refers to a
limited scope of political obligations related to what Samuel Pufendorf described as
being obliged by the sovereign to be exposed to the danger of death in war.7
2 Michael Walzer, Obligations: Essays on Disobedience, War and Citizenship (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1970).
3 This article raises questions that I address in greater length in, Ilan Zvi Baron, Justifying the
Obligation to Die: War Ethics, and Political Obligation with Illustrations from Zionism (Lanham, MD:
Lexington Books, 2009).
4 See for example the American Civil Liberties Union’s legal request for access to such information,
noting that the Defense Department was, ‘Banning photographers on US military bases from
covering the arrival of caskets containing the remains of US soldiers killed overseas’, ACLU Releases
Navy Files On Civilian Casualties In Iraq War (7/2/2008), {http://www.aclu.org/natsec/foia/
35878prs20080702.html} accessed on 17 October 2008). See also the National Security Archive at the
George Washington University, {http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB152/index.htm}
accessed 17 October 2008.
5 Peter Paret, Understanding War: Essays on Clausewitz and the History of Military Power
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992).
6 Michael Walzer, Obligations: Essays on Disobedience, War and Citizenship (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 83.
7 Samuel Pufendorf, in James Tully (ed.), On the Duty of Man and Citizen, trans. Michael Silverthorne
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 158. He uses the term ‘compel’ instead of
obliged.
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Regardless of the slippage that his term suggests between obligations relating to the
risk of death, to death itself and to going to war, Walzer’s term oﬀers a rhetorical
power that is worth keeping and reﬂects the ultimate seriousness of the issue.
Moreover, this rhetorical force highlights the absence of this problem from the
contemporary literature on the ethics of war and on just war theory. This literature
recognises that since war is a human activity it should be subject to moral
considerations. These considerations are distinguished by the two categories of ius
ad bellum (the justice or laws of war) and ius in bello (the justice or laws in war).
Falling within these two categories we ﬁnd the general tenets of the just war
tradition: Under what conditions may another human kill another human and not
be guilty of murder? Why, if at all, would killing in war be justiﬁable? Under what
conditions may a state be justiﬁed in declaring war on another state? What are the
rules or norms for ﬁghting a war? According to the tradition, a war is just if the
criteria of ‘just cause, right intention, proper authority, last resort, eﬀectiveness,
proportionality, [and] discrimination’ are met.8
The theory thus outlines the application of morality to war, and the
contemporary literature generally uses the just war tradition to form sets of
guidelines for the moral evaluation of a particular conﬂict or a particular type of
conﬂict; sometimes the literature critiques one or more of these guidelines or
explains the contribution to the tradition of certain thinkers.9 What is, however,
absent in the way that ius in bello and ius ad bellum are being used is the question
of having to risk one’s life in war. Even the most recent books that address either
just war thinking10 or the ethics of war11 pay scant attention to the morality of
having to die for the state in war and Gaﬀney’s misguided attempt at proportion-
ality confuses proportionality into a kind of ius in bello body count,12 whereas the
problem of the obligation to risk one’s life in war is primarily related to ius ad
bellum.
For every person that dies on the battleﬁeld, there are at least two fundamental
moral issues at stake. The ﬁrst is that of the individual who kills, and the other is
that of the individual who is killed. For every person killed a person dies. This
blatant truism is perhaps so obvious that most contemporary texts on the ethics of
war do not even mention it. In some ways it is slightly absurd that this statement
needs to be made. Yet, the absence of literature on this issue is staggering
considering how much is written on the ethics of war. Why is there so little
contemporary work on this subject, and what questions are not being asked? I
argue that the answer to the ﬁrst question has to do with the acceptance of war
in the international system and of the way that the proper authority tenet in just
war theory has come to be read as a justiﬁcation of the state’s authority to wage
war. If the state has the proper (legitimate may be a better word) authority in this
regard, then surely it follows that it has to be able to justiﬁably oblige at minimum
certain segments of its population into war. If, however, this authority is not taken
8 Chris Brown, Sovereignty, Rights and Justice: International Political Theory Today (Oxford; Malden,
MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), p. 104.
9 For examples of these diﬀerent ways of using just war theory see, Jean Bethke Elshtain, (ed.), Just
War Theory (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992).
10 Alex J. Bellamy, Just Wars: From Cicero to Iraq (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006).
11 Christopher Coker, Ethics and War in the 21st Century (London: Routledge, 2008).
12 Proportionality is more complex then this. See, Thomas Hurka, ‘Proportionality in the Morality of
War’, Philosophy and Public Aﬀairs, 33:1 (2005).
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for granted, then a cascade of deeply moral, political and philosophical questions
follow over the nature or type of the obliging authority, the justiﬁability of the war,
the type of army (volunteer or conscript), and, perhaps most complex of all, the
problem of political obligation itself.13 In an article it is not possible to address all
of these topics in the depth that they deserve, but there is also no text that provides
an account of what questions are not being asked in this regard, why they are not
being asked and why they should be asked.
Consequently, I argue how the problem of the obligation to die has come to be
taken for granted in the literature while also demonstrating that it has not always
been this way, thereby providing a philosophical and ethical exploration of the
obligation to be sent into war and face the danger of death. Subsequently, I
introduce and survey the ethical questions that we need to be asking in order to
bring this deep political theory about obligation and death into applied ethical
practice. I suggest that we take this obligation for granted because of the way that
the tenet of proper authority has come to be understood. Consequently, this article
provides a re-familiarisation of the claims that lie behind the proper authority tenet
in classical just war thought, focusing on how this tenet relates to identity, theories
of state and political obligation. Moreover, the approach taken here begins with
problems of political philosophy and then moves into the applied ethical issues
pertinent to war. As such, I suggest that it is important to understand the
philosophical background to how ethical arguments are made and recognised to be
somehow appropriate to contemporary conditions. In providing this normative
re-engagement with some of the core assumptions contained in the ethics of war
and just war theory, I address future research questions that ethics of war thinkers
should be addressing.
Things aren’t always obvious
For Aristotle it was a given that part of being a citizen involved going to war and
possibly dying in the process. Socrates makes the connection quite clear between
being a good citizen and risking one’s life for the state in war.14 Interestingly, what
Aristotle does say is that it is glorious to die in battle, since to die in war is to
become a hero, and heroes are remembered and it is better to be remembered
than forgotten.15 This warrior ethos, recognising the glory of death in battle,
13 Some notable texts on political obligation are, James S. Fishkin, The Limits of Obligation (London:
Yale University Press, 1982); Margaret Gilbert, A Theory of Political Obligation: Membership,
Commitment, and the Bonds of Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006); John Horton, ‘In Defense
of Associative Political Obligations: Part One’, Political Studies, 54 (2006), ———, ‘In Defense of
Associative Political Obligations: Part Two’, Political Studies, 55:1 (2007); Carole Pateman, The
Problem of Political Obligation: A Critical Analysis of Liberal Theory (Chichester: Wiley, 1979);
Hanna Pitkin, ‘Obligation and Consent’, in Peter Laslett and W. G. R. Runciman and Quentin
Skinner (eds), Philosophy, Politics and Society (Fourth Series) (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972);
———, John Plamenatz, Consent, Freedom and Political Obligation, 2nd edn (London: Oxford
University Press, 1968); A. John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligation (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1980).
14 Plato, The Last Days of Socrates: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, trans. Hugh Tredennick and
Harold Tarrant (London: Penguin Books, 2003).
15 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, J. L. Ackrill (ed.), and trans. J. O. Urmson and David Ross
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
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characteristic in Homer’s Iliad, was the explanation behind why anybody would
even consider dying in war. They died as citizens, but in dying they became heroes.
Dying in war was an obvious possibility for the citizen, but Aristotle still felt some
need to explain why anybody would want to die in war even though he does not
seem to ﬁnd it necessary to explain how the obligation is justiﬁable. The obligation
simply exists by deﬁnition of being a citizen: a theory of obligation is not
necessary.16
However, for St. Augustine, one of the founders of what became known as the
just war tradition, the obligation was not so obvious. In fact, Augustine, and then
Thomas Aquinas among other Christian just war thinkers, was greatly concerned
with this problem, since it had to be explained how the sovereign could without
prejudice to his soul send subjects to their possible death in war, and how those
sent could risk their lives knowing that in doing so and in being sent to kill others
at the same time, they would not be risking their souls either. The problem of being
sent to risk one’s life in war was, for Aristotle a problem relevant primarily to the
politics of heroism, but for Augustine it was a serious problem of political
obligation. Indeed, many of the classical just war theorists and numerous political
philosophers took this obligation quite seriously, and did so in part by elaborating
on the concept of proper authority, although in signiﬁcantly diﬀerent ways.
Augustine’s account of the proper authority in relation to war is rooted in his
overarching concern about individual salvation. He recognises war to be a
horrifying event, even if the waging of war brings about peace.17 Augustine argues
that our lives must be lived in order to achieve salvation, and that obedience is
important in this regard, even when war is concerned, and this is how he argues
that anyone ordered into war by the proper authority must go. Augustine writes:
But when a lawful soldier, obedient to the power under which he has been lawfully placed,
slays a man, he is not guilty of murder according to the laws of his city. On the contrary, if
he does not do so, he is guilty of desertion and contempt of authority. If he had done this
of his own free will and authority, however, he would have fallen into the crime of
shedding human blood.18
In this passage Augustine does many things. He implies that it is necessary to have
the proper authority (that is, ‘the power’, which I take in this context to mean the
same as authority) in order to wage war, because otherwise the war and the killing
it involves would be wrong if not criminal. In addition, he states that nobody can
go to war as an individual. This argument is traditionally assumed to mean that
only states can ﬁght a war, but in an Augustinian context, it also means that
individuals do not have the moral ability to decide when one should ﬁght.
Augustine also emphasises that following the orders of the proper authority is an
imperative. To disobey orders is just as much of a crime as if the soldier were to
kill without orders. Consequently, Augustine makes no allowance for political
16 Which is not to say that conscription in ancient Athens was unproblematic. See, Matthew R. Christ,
‘Conscription of Hoplites in Classical Athens’, The Classical Quarterly, New Series, 51:2 (2001). The
problem of justifying an obligation to die is also taken up by Socrates in and immediately after his
trial. See, Plato, The Last Days of Socrates: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, trans. Hugh
Tredennick and Harold Tarrant (London: Penguin Books, 2003).
17 Augustine, The City of God against the Pagans, R.W. Dyson (ed.), trans. R.W. Dyson (Cambridge;
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 934, (Book XIX 12).
18 Augustine, The City of God, p. 39, (Book I 26).
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disobedience. Rebellion or civil war is not allowed for at least three reasons, which
further contextualise why the proper authorities are to be obeyed. First, because
individuals have no individual rights, there can be no individual right to rebel
against any established order. Second, all humans are guilty (of sin) so it makes
sense to follow those in authority and not try to replace them with others who are
at best equally guilty. Just as there is no individual right to disobey or rebel there
is no collective right. Third, life in the city of man is made possible by the plans
of God, albeit plans concocted after the fall from grace (and the establishment of
human guilt).19 Consequently, individual subjects are to obey, or rather, are
obliged to obey their proper authorities and thus to act according to the order
established by God and to contribute to the possibility of achieving individual
salvation by having a pure soul. Augustine is claiming that the death of the body
is not as great of a concern as is the maintenance of one’s soul.
Augustine’s account of the proper authority is also about clarifying the roles of
the religious authorities and secular ones while maintaining that even in the secular
realm of material concerns it is the overarching belief in the soul and of eternal
salvation that guides the normative conditions of life on earth. St. Augustine’s
political-theology was so inﬂuential that when centuries later St. Thomas Aquinas
argued against Augustine’s deeply negative account of human politics, Aquinas
nevertheless and somewhat paradoxically claimed to be in general agreement with
this master. One of the more important diﬀerences between the two is with their
respective understanding of the conditions in what Augustine calls the ‘City of
Man’. Unlike Augustine, who perceives the need for human socio-political
organisation to be a product of sin, Aquinas sees the city as a positive element
corresponding to the laws of nature. He writes,
It is natural for man to live in fellowship with many others, it is necessary for there to be
some means whereby such a community of men may be ruled. For if many men were to
live together with each providing only what is convenient for himself, the community would
break up into its various parts unless one of them had responsibility for the good of the
community as a whole, just as the body of a man and of any other animal would fall apart
if there were not some general ruling force to sustain the body and secure the common
good of all its parts.20
In its simplest form, Aquinas claims that the state exists because people need to live
in a state in order to survive. He adopts, in another diﬀerence from Augustine’s
Platonism, Aristotle’s teleological understanding of the human condition arguing
that, ‘Man is by nature a social and political animal, who lives in a community.’21
19 For more on the political thought of St. Augustine see, Herbert A. Deane, The Political and Social
Ideas of St. Augustine (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963); Augustine, Political Writings,
E. M. Atkins and R.J. Dodaro (eds) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); R. W. Dyson,
Normative Theories of Society and Government in Five Medieval Thinkers: St. Augustine, John of
Salisbury, Giles of Rome, St. Thomas Aquinas, and Marsilius of Padua (Lewiston, N.Y.; Lampeter:
Edwin Mellen Press, 2003); Jean Bethke Elshtain, Augustine and the Limits of Politics (Notre Dame,
Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998); Paul Ramsey, in Jean Bethke Elshtain (ed.), ‘The Just
War According to St. Augustine’, Just War Theory (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992).
20 Thomas Aquinas, Political Writings, R.W. Dyson (ed.), trans. R. W. Dyson (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005), p. 7 (De Regimine Principum).
21 Aquinas, Political Writings, pp. 5–6 (De Regimine Principum). There is some debate as to the
accuracy of Aquinas’ translation of Aristotle’s famous description of man as a political animal (a
zõon politikon). Dyson argues that Aquinas’ translation (which Aquinas takes from a Latin
translation of Aristotle, but is apparently already used by Seneca) is more accurate in its inclusion
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Consequently, as this reference to nature attests to, Aquinas argues that
obligations to obey the proper authorities are natural, and in a slight twist on
Augustine’s account, writes that, ‘Therefore as man must obey God in all things,
so too must he obey his superiors.’22 With such a direct link between obeying God
and obeying one’s superiors, Aquinas’ account is also clearly related to religious
salvation. In this regard, A. P. D’Entrèves says that, ‘It is enough to remember the
main principle which St. Thomas develops, that, as the duty of obedience to
authority is grounded both upon divine and natural order, its limits are necessarily
ﬁxed by the correspondence of human authority with divine and natural law, that
is, with justice.’23 The purpose of human laws may be to ‘lead men to virtue’,24 but
not all virtues can be led to by human law, and in any case, the reason for living
a life of virtue is to live a life according to the will of God. This is why Aquinas
can argue that a good king can take the sons of his subjects and send them to their
possible death in war.25
What both Augustine and Aquinas demonstrate is, as D’Entrèves points out in
relation to Aquinas but is true of Augustine as well,26 that the problem of being
obliged to obey human authority was a great concern in medieval political thought,
a concern that remained constant throughout the history of political thought. The
debates have changed, with individual rights and consent eventually supplanting
the role of salvation and ‘natural’ obedience, but while their concern with the issue
of being obliged into war played a signiﬁcant part in their just war thinking, this
focus has been somewhat lost. I say somewhat because while contemporary just
war texts do not address this problem, related arguments over the problem of being
obliged into war can be found in many notable philosophical works outside of the
just war tradition. Spinoza, Rousseau, Kant, Hobbes and Hegel all mention this
obligation in various ways and recognise the challenges that it poses to the
normative conditions of life in the state. Consequently, how has it been that this
obligation has become taken for granted?
One possible answer has to do with the false disciplinary boundaries that have
existed between Political Theory and International Relations since the problem of
being sent by the state to risk one’s life is technically an issue of political
obligation. Famously pointed out by Martin Wight, political theorists have by and
large not been interested in questions of international relations.27 Wight was
wrong, but the argument is certainly consistent with the way that academia tends
to distinguish between political theorists and international relations scholars,
although this divide is becoming increasingly challenged. A more plausible answer
could be with the way that the modern state has come to be identiﬁed.
of the word social than the ‘literal’ translation that uses only the adjective political to describe ‘man’.
Hannah Arendt, however, argues that the Latin translation is erroneous in that the ‘word “social”
is Roman in origin and has no equivalent in Greek language or thought.’ Hannah Arendt, The
Human Condition (London and Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1958), p. 23.
22 Aquinas, Political Writings, p. 67.
23 Alessandro Passerin d’Entrèves, The Medieval Contribution to Political Thought: Thomas Aquinas,
Marsilius of Padua, Richard Hooker (New York: Humanities Press, 1959), p. 34.
24 Aquinas, Political Writings, p. 141 (Summa Theologiae IaIIae 96).
25 Aquinas, Political Writings. p. 56 (Summa Theologiae IaIIae 105:1).
26 Passerin d’Entrèves, The Medieval Contribution to Political Thought.
27 Martin Wight, ‘Why Is There No International Theory’, International Relations, 21:1 (1960).
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In just war terminology, both Augustine and Aquinas frame the problem of the
obligation to risk one’s life in war as one of proper authority. The obligation is
justiﬁed when it comes from the proper or legitimate authority. Consequently, one
reason why this issue is no longer addressed may be with how the understanding
of ‘proper authority’ in the ethics of war literature has changed. In this regard, one
major change in our thinking has been the acceptance of Weber’s argument that
the state owns the monopoly on the legitimate use of force.28 Subsequently, it has
become a conventional wisdom that the state is the only legitimate actor who may
resort to international armed force. While classical just war theorists often found
it necessary to address the complexity of proper authority, this tenet has become
almost shorthand for the state. It is not an error to presume that just war theory
supports this claim that only states have the legitimacy to resort to armed force,
but it is a simpliﬁcation with consequences, one of which is that we no longer ask
such ‘questions of state’ that illuminate the conditions and questions that
characterise modern international political life. Consequently, it has become
acceptable to provide little explanation of the obligation to go into war, since war
is a fundamental aspect of the modern state and as such is a deﬁnitional
component of state sovereignty over the citizenry. If the state has the legitimate
authority to use force then it must also be able to justiﬁably obligate those into
using force and as a consequence, when sent into war, of risking their lives.
Another possible answer, and which follows from this way of reading the
proper authority tenet, is with the way that war has become increasingly treated
in international law, and in particular with the project of trying to outlaw war. The
international lawyer Yoram Dinstein notes that contemporary international legal
literature does not engage with ius ad bellum. Ius ad bellum, along with its
philosophical and theological referents, are not the kinds of issues that inter-
national lawyers engage with anymore.29 According to Dinstein, one of the reasons
for this absence within the international legal community has to do with how the
issues behind the legality of war are of a philosophical, moral and possibly
theological character. International law has, so it seems, solved the ius ad bellum
problem by trying to outlaw war and claiming that any legal resort to violence has
to be of a defensive nature. A war, consequently, can become justiﬁed provided
that it is a response to an illegal act of aggression. Just war theorists thus have an
excuse not to critique the ius ad bellum components. The philosopher Robert
Holmes notes that, ‘Most modern theorists [. . .] devote little attention to the
question of whether a war is justiﬁed; they assume that it is and ask only under
what conditions it is justiﬁed and how it is to be conducted justly.’30 To a certain
degree this assumption is not surprising, although post September 11th 2001, this
assumption is becoming increasingly challenged (especially when debating the war
in Iraq).31 Such challenges notwithstanding, if war is rendered illegal by inter-
28 Max Weber, ‘The Profession and Vocation of Politics’, in Max Weber, Peter Lassman, and Ronald
Speirs (eds), Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 310–1.
29 Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, 3rd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2001), p. 63.
30 Robert L. Holmes, On War and Morality (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 163.
31 Although post 9/11 and especially in regard to the war in Iraq the debate has broadened over the
justiﬁable causes for war. See, James Turner Johnson, The War to Oust Saddam Hussein: Just War
and the New Face of Conﬂict (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littleﬁeld Publishers, 2005); Lee Feinstein
and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘A Duty to Prevent’, Foreign Aﬀairs, 83:1 (2004); Neta C. Crawford,
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national law, then what matters is not the question of resorting to force or the
problem of proper authority, but how responses to illegal resorts to force can be
kept within the moral codes that led to the outlaw of war in the ﬁrst place.
According to Dinstein, ‘In the nineteenth and (and early part of the twentieth)
century, the attempt to diﬀerentiate between just and unjust wars in positive
international law was discredited and abandoned.’32 W. E. Hall gives two reasons
behind this abandonment in his famous Treatise on International Law. First,
disputes or causes leading to war are usually not based in ‘any fundamental
principle of law’,33 and are consequently, ‘too complex to be judged with any
certainty [. . .].’34 The rules which jurists have made in regard to a just cause have
been, ‘mere abstract statements of principles, or perhaps of truisms, which it is
unnecessary to reproduce.’35 Hall then references Ayala, Grotius, Vattel,36 and a
few others as sources of such truisms and vague statements of principle. Hall’s
second reason is that even if it were possible to determine which side in war was
right and which side was wrong, it would still be futile to attempt to punish the
aggressor since no enforcement mechanism exists. ‘The obedience which is paid to
law must be a willing obedience, and when a state has taken up arms unjustly it
is useless to expect it to acquiesce in the imposition of penalties for its act.’37
First published in 1880, Hall’s Treatise argues that any notion of just cause is
not only legally useless, but also pointless. Even if it were possible to determine
which side in war has the just cause, doing so does nothing to limit the possibilities
for war. Moreover, because of the legal identity of states as parties of equal rights,
it follows that any state has the legal right to wage war thus removing any legal
need for a just cause. Hall writes,
International law has consequently no alternative but to accept war, independent of its
origin, as a relation which the parties to it may set up if they choose, and to busy itself
only in regulating the eﬀects of the relation. Hence, both parties to every war are regarded
as being in an identical legal position, and consequently as being possessed of equal
rights.38
In the 19th Century opinion was, as exempliﬁed by Hall, that ius ad bellum issues
were not a problem due to the practices of states, viewed as equal agents, which
made such concerns irrelevant. After WWI, however, this opinion changed, as
‘The Slippery Slope to Preventive War’, Ethics and International Aﬀairs, 17:1 (2003); Whitley
Kaufman, ‘What’s Wrong with Preventive War? The Moral and Legal Basis for the Preventive Use
of Force’, Ethics and International Aﬀairs, 19:3 (2005); Jeﬀ McMahan, ‘Just Cause for War’, Ethics
and International Aﬀairs, 19:3 (2005); Jeﬀ McMahan, ‘War as Self-Defense’, Ethics and International
Aﬀairs,18:1 (2004); Thomas M. Nichols, ‘Just War, Not Prevention’, Ethics and International Aﬀairs,
17:1 (2003); Cian O’Driscoll, ‘Negotiating the Just War Tradition: Anticipation, Punishment,
Humanitarianism and the Right to War after Iraq’ (University of Wales, 2006); Michael Walzer,
Arguing About War (New Haven, CT; London: Yale University Press, 2004).
32 Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, p. 63. Dinstein references J. L. Brierly, ‘International
Law and Resort to Armed Force’, Cambridge Journal of Law, 4 (1930–32), p. 308. In this article
J. L Brierly, in turn, references William Edward Hall, in A. Pearce Higgins (ed.), Treatise on
International Law, 8th edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), p. 81.
33 Hall, Treatise on International Law, p. 81.
34 Ibid., p. 82.
35 Ibid.
36 Ayala’s De Jure et Oﬃciis Bellicis was published in 1582. Hugo Grotius lived from 1583–1645.
Emmerich de Vattel lived from 1714–1767.
37 Hall, Treatise on International Law, p. 82.
38 Ibid.
Dying for the state 223
concerns about legitimate causes became a dominant issue. This shift is demon-
strated by the international community’s attempts to punish Germany and demand
that Germany accept all culpability for the First World War.39 This shift continued
with the development of positive law about legal and illegal wars, the Kellogg/
Briand pact of 1928, and the UN Charter of 1945.40
Modern international law has tried to outlaw war (with varying degrees of
success). International law started to formally limit the legality of war with Article
2 of the Hague Convention (I) of 1899 as well as that of 1907. The convention
called for states to resort to arms only after non-violent means had been attempted.
In 1919 the Covenant of the League of Nations attempted to further limit the
possibilities of war by giving the League some powers to prevent war from
breaking out. In 1928, the Kellogg/Briand Pact declared war illegal in principle.41
In 1945, the Charter of the United Nations continued this process of trying to
outlaw war. Article 2 (Chapter 1) of the Charter states that, ‘All members shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.’42 Chapter VII provides the
legal options under which a war can be waged, which other than a war of self-
defence, requires a resolution of the Security Council (in which case one wonder
whether the term ‘war’ is accurate).
The legal theorist Hans Kelsen illustrates this shift in international legal
thinking by using the concept of aggression to identify the illegality of a war. He
writes,
The rules of international law by which ‘war’ is forbidden, and accordingly, a ‘delict’, refer
only to the action of one state, not to the counteraction of the other. This is usually
expressed by the statement that only a war of aggression, that is, the war on the part of the
state which is the ﬁrst to commit a hostile act of force, is forbidden, not the war waged by
the state defending itself against the aggressor.43
Hedley Bull provides another example of this kind of theorising about war when
he identiﬁes a Grotian approach that seeks to distinguish when a war is sanctioned
by international society and when it is not.44
The attempt to outlaw war has eﬀectively altered how war is thought of.
Michael Walzer’s method in Just and Unjust Wars is to start with an account of
39 Hans Kelsen, in Robert W. Tucker (ed.), Principles of International Law, 2nd edn (New York;
London: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1966).
40 See chapter XXX in, Josef L. Kunz, The Changing Law of Nations: Essays on International Law
(Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1968).
41 Although Carl Schmitt argues that the Kellogg/Briand Pact actually sanctiﬁes war. See, Carl Schmitt,
The Concept of the Political (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 50 fn. 21. Alternatively,
Hans Kelsen does not claim that the Kellogg/Briand pact sanctions war; rather he argues that the
pact diﬀerentiates between types of war. See, Kelsen, Principles of International Law, p. 27.
42 Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, p. 80. The UN Charter can also be accessed online at
{http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/}.
43 Kelsen, Principles of International Law, p. 25. See also pages 29–39 for his discussion of just war
doctrine.
44 Bull’s ‘Grotian conception of international society’ is presented in opposition to Oppenheim’s
approach that takes war to be a prerogative of the state and claims that international law is
concerned with the conduct of war and not the legality of going to war. See, Hedley Bull, ‘The
Grotian Conception of International Society’, in Herbet Butterﬁeld and Martin Wight (eds),
Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics (London: George Allen &
Unwin Ltd., 1966).
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aggression as the only real crime that exists between states. With a legal war
requiring another to break the law with an act of aggression, to a signiﬁcant degree
ius ad bellum has in a sense been replaced by ius contra bellum (justice against
war).45 International law is, of course, not so straightforward. A war or a similar
resort to force could be legal under other sections of the Charter, or may be
justiﬁed solely by reference to the purposes of the Charter. However, while
approaches to the justiﬁability and legality of war have changed, the presumption
on the authority of the state to wage war has not. The claim in the 19th Century
that war is a presumed prerogative of the state eﬀectively meant that ius ad bellum
issues were not a problem. In the 20th Century, this presumption was no longer
accepted and positive international law became concerned with the legality or
illegality of war. However, in both the 19th and 20th Centuries, as well as in the
21st Century, there was no debate about what it is about the state that makes it
the authority that may justiﬁably, either because of convention or because of
positive law, go to war.
Nevertheless, such questions are important, as the early just war theorists knew.
They point out that in order to provide an ethical argument about applying
morality to war we need to think philosophically about the political conditions that
give such ethical arguments the sound of plausibility and applicability. The
problem of the obligation to die is, however, not solely about political obligation,
but also about a variety of related and equally moral and political considerations
that the ethics of war literature takes for granted. Consequently, it is time to recall
a lesson of the classical just war theorists and take a critical look at what moral,
political and philosophical questions arise in relation to the problem of being
obliged into battle by the state. There are at least ﬁve explicitly relevant questions
to the moral problem of being obligated to be exposed to the danger of death in
war:
1. That of individual consent;
2. Whether or not any state can be justiﬁed in obliging its citizens in this regard
and whether or not the type of government is important;
3. Whether or not the problem of the obligation diﬀers between conscript and
volunteer armies;
4. How any individual could be presumed to have a moral obligation to obey the
law to be sent into war and not resist this politico-legal obligation;
5. Whether a citizen may be obliged to go into any war.
These questions overlap and there are sub-questions and combination ques-
tions, including how membership involves an obligation that goes against the
natural right to self-preservation, what makes the state an entity able to obligate
its citizens to risk their lives on its behalf, how ideology serves as a justifying force
for people who risk their lives in war, and does it matter who is obliged? There are
surely other relevant considerations, but for now I am limiting myself to these ﬁve,
45 Josef Kunz describes this shift as being from bellum justum to bellum legale. Kunz argues that the
League of Nations Covenant replaced the justiﬁability and unjustiﬁability of war with formal legal
rules about the legality or illegality of war. Thus a legal war could be fought by a state that had
no just cause but had the formal approval of the League. The Kellog/Briand Pact furthered this
distinction by declaring war to be, in principle, an illegal means to pursue foreign policy. See, Kunz,
The Changing Law of Nations, p. 580.
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thereby making it possible to demonstrate how these questions are linked, what
broader questions they raise, and why it is important to address the philosophical
issues that contextualise our ethical thinking about the morality of obligation,
death and war.
1. Consenting to risk one’s life
In his account of sending individuals to war, Kant raises a paradigmatic problem.
Considering that in a state of international anarchy states may wage war against
each other, and that the sovereign has the prerogative to do so when in the state’s
best interest, by what moral justiﬁcation could the sovereign send his subjects to
war? Kant, the moral philosopher who says that humans must be treated as ends
and not means states in The Metaphysics of Morals that,
If we consider the original right of free states in the state of nature to make war upon one
another (for example, in order to bring about a condition closer to that governed by right),
we must ﬁrst ask what right the state has as against its own subjects to employ them in a
war on other states, and to expend or hazard their possessions or even their lives in the
process. Does it not then depend upon their own judgement whether they wish to go to war
or not? May they simply be sent thither at the sovereign’s supreme command?46
Kant claims that the individual must be given the chance to consent to this
obligation, although there is some trouble as to how this consent is presumed to
take place since Kant also says that the subjects must obey the sovereign. Thus,
Kant implies that to think about the obligation to die is to think about the
conditions under which legitimate resistance to authority may take place.
There is much more that can be said here, but what should not escape notice
is that Thomas Hobbes provides a surprisingly similar argument. According to the
basic argument contained in Leviathan that postulates that people trade certain
liberties for security, if the sovereign were to ask its citizens to risk their lives by
going to war then two problems immediately arise. First, the citizen could refuse
the demand and claim that it makes no sense to go to war for the sake of a
contract that is supposed to avoid war. Second, the citizen would have a legitimate
right to rebel against the sovereign who has clearly been unable to guarantee the
terms of the contract in which the sovereign is supposed to protect the lives of its
subjects or citizens. The obligation to die would be a concrete example of a failed
contract. However, Hobbes in chapter 21 of Leviathan recognises that this
obligation is crucial for sovereignty. He claims that the inhabitants are obliged to
risk their lives if the commonwealth is threatened. If the community is at risk of
being dissolved by a foreign threat and for the sake of the good provided by the
commonwealth an obligation to risk dying emerges. Presumably, wars of aggres-
sion would not justify such an obligation, although this conclusion does not apply
since Hobbes asserts that the sovereign may go to war if the sovereign deems it
necessary for the security and prosperity of the commonwealth.47
46 Immanuel Kant, Kant: Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H. B. Nisbet, 2nd edn (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 166. (emphasis in original).
47 Thomas Hobbes, in Richard Tuck (ed.), Leviathan, Rev. student ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), p. 126 (ch. 18).
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The problem that Hobbes and the consent tradition has to resolve is why the
contract makes an allowance for people to violate that basic and inviolable natural
right of self-preservation.48 Indeed, contra chapter 21, Hobbes could easily be
assumed to say that under no conditions can the obligation to die be justiﬁed
because nobody can give up their right to life without thereby entering the state of
nature, and if the sovereign places them in this position they have no reason to
obey. Empirically, however, we know that the state has been extremely successful,
particularly in the 20th Century, in sending its citizens into war. Not only have
various dictatorships, autocracies, monarchies and other non-democratic states
been successful, but so have democracies. If consent is an important moral
category in the construction of a just state, would a war be just if those sent into
war are not given the chance to consent to going into war?49 Consequently, from
a moral standpoint it may be that one of the just war tenets should take into
account the type of government that sends its citizens into war, or if not the type
of government, the type of state.
2. The type of state
Does it matter whether or not any state can be justiﬁed in sending its inhabitants
to risk their lives in war? The problem of any authority sending its subjects into
war was one of the considerations that animated the just war thinkers who sought
to restrict who could be justiﬁed in declaring war. This restriction is approached
in the just war literature under the tenet of proper authority, with the argument
being that only a proper authority may declare war, and, subsequently, only the
proper authority can obligate members of the community to risk their lives in war.
I suggested above that the proper authority tenet contributed to contemporary
ethics of war literature ignoring the problem of the obligation to die. In
contemporary just war literature this tenet serves to legitimise states as the only
actors who could wage war and legitimises states with speciﬁc powers in relation
to other states. The proper authority tenet came to be seen not as a foundation for
justifying the authority of the state in relation to its inhabitants, but in relation to
other states. By linking together the state with the ability to legitimately declare
war, ‘proper authority’ establishes a community of agents with similar abilities in
relation to each other, thus restricting who may enter into the community of
nations, who may wage war, conduct relevant treaty negotiations and so on.
Consequently, while it was important for early just war theorists such as St.
Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas to justify the authority in relation to its
domestic constituents, this feature became overshadowed by a process of reading
this tenet as a feature explaining an international system. This shift became
increasingly pronounced in modern international law.
48 Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 93, 141, and 51. (Chapters 14, 20, and 21). In chapter 14 he claims that is
preferable to be a slave than to die, and in chapter 21 he claims that the sovereign may not ask a
subject to kill himself or another individual.
49 Paul Stern has addressed the role of nationalism in over-riding motives of self-preservation in going
to risk one’s life in war. Paul C. Stern, ‘Why Do People Sacriﬁce for Their Nations?’, Political
Psychology, 16:2 (1995).
Dying for the state 227
This reading of the proper authority tenet, however, leaves unanswered whether
or not any authority is justiﬁed in going to war and thus sending its inhabitants
into battle? Medieval just war works also include treatments on the issue of
rebellion and resistance to the proper authority. Both Augustine and Aquinas
heavily circumscribe any possibility for legitimate disobedience to authority, but
the important point is that they addressed it as part of their exploration of political
obligation to the proper authority. For example, Augustine’s claim that since we
all live in a world of sin it would be futile to overthrow one imperfect ruler with
another indicates a concern with the character of the authority doing the obliging.
Augustine further addresses this issue in regard to diﬀerent types of authority. For
example, he claims that a priest should not take charge over material issues of rule,
although a priest could certainly counsel or guide a temporal ruler.50 The
outstanding question, however, which needs to be addressed, is whether or not any
state has this proper authority. Some of the just war thinkers did in fact address
this issue, such as Vitoria who asks whether or not the American Indians could be
considered to have dominion over their land, and thus be justiﬁed in resisting the
theft of their property.51
This issue has also been addressed, albeit indirectly, in some modern liberal
thought on the problem of political obligation. A notable example of this turn is
with the idea of ‘hypothetical consent’. In a seminal two-part article on the
problem of political obligation, Hannah Pitkin makes the case for what she terms,
‘hypothetical consent’. The idea is to focus on the nature of government and
whether or not the government ought to be obeyed. ‘For a legitimate government,
a true authority, one whose subjects are obliged to obey it, emerges as being one
to which they ought to consent.’52 Pitkin’s account of ‘hypothetical consent’ is
shorthand for deﬁning the problem of political obligation as being obligated to
consent and not consenting to be obligated, provided that the government is just.
‘It is not so much your consent not even the consent of a majority that obligates
you. You do not consent to be obligated, but rather are obligated to consent, if
the government is just.’53
Taking this approach to the problem of the obligation to die the issue becomes
whether or not any state can be just in obligating its citizens into war by virtue of
whether or not the state or the government ought to be obeyed. It is in this regard
that Barry Buzan suggests that in thinking about bombing populations as part of
a humanitarian intervention, a decisive factor should be whether the population
deserves their government.54 The question remains, however, as to what kind of
state can justiﬁably oblige its citizens into war. This question in turn leads to the
thorny issue of disobedience and rebellion, since if the state goes to war and the
citizenry refuse to ﬁght the state has got a serious problem on its hands as its
50 Augustine, in E. M. Atkins and R. J. Dodaro (eds), Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001).
51 Francisco de Vitoria, in Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrance (eds), Political Writings (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991).
52 Hanna Pitkin, ‘Obligation and Consent – I’, The American Political Science Review, 59:4 (1965),
p. 999. See also, ———, ‘Obligation and Consent – II’, The American Political Science Review, 60:1
(1966).
53 Pitkin, ‘Obligation and Consent – I.’
54 Barry Buzan, ‘Who May We Bomb?’, in Ken Booth and Tim Dunne (eds), Worlds in Collision (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).
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authority vaporises. At minimum the government would collapse. Nevertheless, it
would be reasonable to suggest that there is more to this aspect of the obligation
to die than to repackage it as one of rebellion or disobedience. In short, may any
state justiﬁably obligate its citizens to risk their lives by being sent into war, why,
and how come such states would be justiﬁed in doing so? It seems reasonable to
suggest that to be just in this regard the state must respect the rights of its citizens,
since it makes no sense to obligate people to risk their lives for the sake of a state
that persecutes them. However, this in turn raises further questions about rights,
as well as what forms of political structures best respect human freedoms or human
values. This issue is complicated, but it is important and is worth further study in
thinking about the ethics of war. For now, however, these questions about consent
and about the type of state and type of government suggest another concern, that
of how the state manages to populate its armed forces.
3. Conscripts or volunteers
Is the consent problem solved by whether or not those sent into war sign up
voluntarily? Consent theory needs to explain how the rights of the individual are
respected within the obligation to take part in war. This problem suggests
categorising diﬀerent types of soldiers: voluntary conscripts who sign up because
the army provides a job, individuals who sign up for ideological reasons, or people
who are drafted. Whether the force is voluntary or not suggests alternative models
of the political obligation problem, and not speciﬁcally of the obligation to die.
However, at issue here is not the issue of national service, but of such service in
regard to war and the ethics of war and in this regard it is sensible to inquire into
how those who are sent into battle come to ﬁnd themselves in the armed forces.
Serving in the army, air force, navy or other branch of the armed forces cannot
be divorced from the possibility of also facing what Walzer called the obligation
to die. Insofar as a volunteer force is concerned, volunteers would presumably have
accepted at least the possibility of the obligation to die. However, in countries that
institute a national draft, under what aegis does the obligation to serve and risk
one’s life become justiﬁable? Conventional approaches to this question would
presumably turn on some account of consent theory, be it one framed on the type
of government as in Pitkin’s argument of ‘hypothetical consent’ already mentioned
or some other logic of consent, of which there are many.55
However, whichever logic of consent is taken, the important point is that it
does not matter how the army is populated since the state will presume the ability
to send any kind of soldier into war. Being a volunteer does not necessarily excuse
the state for demanding (even in a voluntary way) its citizens to risk their lives. The
moral issue here is that the state can always oblige, if not enforce, its citizens to
go to war regardless of the type of war or the type of conscript.56 This point is
made by Tim O’Brien in his account of the Vietnam War. O’Brien notes that the
55 Some of these are surveyed in, George Klosko, Political Obligations (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2005).
56 The state’s ability to enforce this obligation is, according to Cheyney Ryan, one of the deﬁning
characteristics of the obligation to die in war, as opposed to other situations where one might be
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state has always been able to send its youth into war and even those who do not
want to go submit to the state, if only because they are afraid of incurring
‘society’s censure’.57 For either conscripts or volunteers, there is no room for
evaluating and then acting on the extent to which they agree with the war they are
ﬁghting. As O’Brien discovered ﬁrst-hand, it does not matter if the war is just –
they will still be sent into harm’s way. Conscripts can be held accountable for
refusing to relinquish their right to life, even in a just war, as in the extreme case
of Private Eddie Slovik, who on General Dwight Eisenhower’s orders, was
executed for desertion in the Second World War.58 Dubiously, and as Peter Paret
notes, those who face the death of battle are rarely those who have declared war
and yet these decision makers will take it for granted that they can send conscript
or recruit soldiers to face the danger of death in war.59
Nevertheless, there may be an additional justifying factor in the case where
those who go to war are volunteers. However, this factor would need to be
mitigated by two additional concerns: that of the necessity of the war and of the
absolute need to win the war (that is, in cases where Walzer’s supreme emergency
clause would be relevant),60 and of the conditions under which people enlist. The
second issue seems more serious since it challenges the assumption that the
obligation to die would be justiﬁed in a volunteer army because those who sign up
freely chose to do so. What if this free choice is not really free? What about those
who sign up because otherwise they cannot aﬀord university, or because it is a way
to stay out of jail or a way to secure food, clothing and shelter? The volunteer
army argument might work if there is a level playing ﬁeld among those who have
the option to volunteer.
This has become a particularly politicised issue in the US.61 In a 2002 op-ed in
The New York Times the Democratic Congressman from New York, Charles B.
Rangel wrote, ‘A disproportionate number of the poor and members of minority
groups make up the enlisted ranks of the military, while the most privileged
Americans are underrepresented or absent.’62 This perspective about the American
Armed Forces is repeated in a November 2005 article in The Washington Post that
claimed that Army recruits were primarily poor and from rural areas.63 The article
implied that the Army eﬀectively provided these individuals with a job, shelter and
something to do. Another New York Times article claims that minorities feature
heavily in the US Armed Forces,64 unlike the British Military where in the UK
obliged to risk one’s life. See, Cheyney C. Ryan, ‘Self-Defense and the Obligations to Kill and to
Die’, Ethics and International Aﬀairs, 18:1 (2004); Ryan, ‘The State and War Making’.
57 Tim O’Brien, If I Die in a Combat Zone (London, New York, Toronto and Sydney: Harper
Perennial, 2006), p. 45.
58 Cheyney Ryan, ‘The State and War Making’, in John T. Sanders and Jan Narveson (eds), For and
against the State: New Philosophical Readings (Lanham, Md.; London: Rowman & Littleﬁeld, 1996).
59 Peter Paret, ‘Justifying the Obligation of Military Service’, The Journal of Military History, 57:5
(1993).
60 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust War: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 3rd edn (New
York: Basic Books, 2000).
61 It was not always political in the same way, for initially the politics surrounded the success of having
a volunteer only force. See, Richard V. L. Cooper, ‘The All-Volunteer Force: Five Years Later’,
International Security, 2:4 (1978).
62 Charles B. Rangel, ‘Bring Back the Draft’, The New York Times (31 December 2002).
63 Ann Scott Tyson, ‘Youths in Rural US Are Drawn to Military; Recruits’ Job Worries Outweigh
War Fears’, The Washington Post (4 November 2005).
64 Bob Herbert, ‘Someone Else’s Child’, The New York Times (20 June 2005).
230 Ilan Zvi Baron
there remains a tradition of the upper classes enlisting in the Armed Forces.65 In
2005 the right-wing think tank, The Heritage Foundation, countered these views of
US Army demographics, claiming that the Army is in fact representative of the
American population.66 Moreover, the Heritage Foundation argued that in 1999
army recruits were more educated than the ‘equivalent general population’ and the
‘household income of recruits generally matches the income distribution of the
American population.’67
However, there are signiﬁcant segments of the American public not growing up
with any equality of opportunity. According to the US Army’s 2004 Demographic
Report, from 1990–2004, approximately half of all Active Duty Oﬃcers have a
Bachelor’s Degree (47.2 per cent-54 per cent), although this is not the case with the
Active Duty Enlisted. In 1990 94.8 per cent of Active Duty Enlisted men and
women had less than a Bachelor’s Degree, although only 1.8 per cent had no High
School Diploma. These ﬁgures remain relatively constant from 1990 until 2004. In
2004, 0.8 per cent had no High School Diploma and 93.7 per cent had less than
a Bachelor’s Degree. The Army Enlistees are generally with little post-secondary
education. In the same period (1990–2004) 18.3 per cent of Active Duty members
are Black or African American, 64.0 per cent are White; in 2000, the US Census
showed that 12.3 per cent of the American population is Black or African
American and 75.1 per cent are White.68 In relation to other minorities, it is clear
that they are proportionally over-represented in the US Military. Ultimately, there
is doubt as to how much choice possible enlistees in the US Army face in their life
prospects were they not to join the Army. In other words, it is possible that the
voluntary force in the US is not so voluntary as it may appear. Many people may
sign up because they have little other choices available to them and because, as the
Christian Science Monitor reported in 2005, the Army oﬀers the best economic
opportunity.69
There has been work done on some of the moral issues involved in a volunteer
army as opposed to national conscription,70 and of the problem of the political
obligation of military service.71 One question suggested by this literature is the
extent to which a state can ignore the diﬀerence between a conscript and a
volunteer force, and send either type of soldier into battle. Indeed, if we are to
have a better grasp of the ethics of war and the justiﬁability of the obligation
to die, surely it is important to think about the demographics of those sent into
war.
65 Alan Cowell, ‘Ideas and Trends: Class Wars; Britain’s Upper Crust Still Soldiers On’, The New York
Times (7 September 2003).
66 Tim Kane, ‘Who Bears the Burden? Demographic Characteristics of US Military Recruits before
and after 9/11’, (Washington DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2005).
67 Kane, ‘Who Bears the Burden?’
68 ‘Proﬁles of General Demographic Characteristics’, ed. Economics and Statistics Administration US
Department of Commerce, U.S Census Bureau (US Census Bureau, 2000); ‘2004 Demographics’, ed.
United States of America Oﬃce of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (2004).
69 Mark Sappenﬁeld, ‘Where Recruiting Runs Strongest’, The Christian Science Monitor (19 July 2005).
70 During the Vietnam War, there were many articles, often based on statistics that examined the
lottery draft and examined a variety of issues ranging from salaries to demographics. A moral
account of military service is addressed in Walzer, Obligations.
71 Klosko, Political Obligations.
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4. The political obligation problem
The vast amount of literature that seeks to clarify and/or explain the problem of
political obligation tends not to ask the question in relation to the obligation to
die. One notable exception here is Michael Walzer’s essay, in which he addresses
the problem of being sent into war as a problem of political obligation. He ends
his essay on the obligation to die by claiming that,
All this comes dangerously near to suggesting that a man is obligated to die only if he feels
or thinks himself obligated. That seems to be the consequence of arguing ﬁrst, with
Rousseau, that there are moral goods for which a man might well be bound to die, and
arguing, secondly, against Rousseau, that it is never possible to say that a particular man is
bound to die for a particular moral good (unless he has said so himself).72
To claim that the obligation to die exists only if it is presumed to exist by each
citizen is true in a sense, since at issue are social constructions. Moreover, there is
something comforting about presuming that this obligation exists in the minds of
the citizens and not in the abilities of the sovereign or the remote halls of
government. However, this conclusion is not especially helpful or illuminating. It
is ironic that this is one of Walzer’s conclusions considering that he wrote this
essay in response to the Vietnam War, which involved a draft for a war that many
did not support. Yet, so long as Walzer’s conclusion is of this kind, then the draft
in this war would be just, which would seem to run counter to the intent of
Walzer’s examinations on war and ethics. Furthermore, the lottery draft at this
time surely lends some empirical doubt as to how far consent counts when the state
decides to go to war. To be fair, Walzer’s essay, The Obligation to Die, is
exceptional in scope and detail, and the strengths of the essay are in his
observations about some of the classical arguments that have served to justify this
obligation. As an argument serving to explain how the obligation could be just,
however, the essay is lacking for Walzer does not explain how the obligation to die
can be justiﬁed. His ﬁnal statement on the obligation is to claim that people will
choose to accept the obligation to die because it is a part of choosing to live like
a citizen.
One of Walzer’s additional conclusions in the essay is that feeling obliged and
being obliged are diﬀerent, and that being obliged is in a sense contingent on being
a good citizen, bound to the common life of the community. Hegel, Rousseau, and
Socrates heavily inﬂuence this argument. Indeed, the death of Socrates is an
important example of the obligation to die. Yet, what does it mean to be a good
citizen? Does being a good citizen mean that one has to be prepared to die for the
state? If so, why? How does being a good citizen explain why the sovereign may
justiﬁably oblige its subjects (in this case, citizens) in this manner? Why does being
a good citizen mean that the sovereign can be presumed to have the power to
oblige in this way? Walzer is either curiously silent or overly brief in regard to these
questions insofar as they serve to justify the obligation to die. His justiﬁcation of
the liberal egalitarian state could provide some headway into what is necessary for
the obligation to be just, although this line of inquiry would lead to a debate about
what sort of state could justiﬁably oblige, which is a diﬀerent question from what
is it about the state that gives it the ability to justiﬁably send its citizens to their
72 Walzer, Obligations, p. 98.
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possible death in war and, subsequently, how this obligation is justiﬁed. If one were
to take the consent argument at face value and presume that consent does take
place, what would happen in a state where consent does not take place, or if people
do not consent and are forced to go into war anyway? In this case, the obligation
could not be morally justiﬁable, but in general remarkably little would be aﬀected
since the obligation would still stand and most citizens would still be sent or go
into war, as was the case in the Vietnam War. In short, what Walzer does is repeat
the Kantian dichotomy between individual morality demanding that those sent to
war are given the choice and the reality that the state may compel its citizens into
war if government decides to.73
5. War
Can the obligation be just in any war? This question suggests that there is a
connection between the ius in bello and ius ad bellum requirements and the
justiﬁability of the obligation to die. In normative terms there should be some
relation, since it seems questionable to be just in risking one’s life for an unjust
war, although the classical just war theorists would claim that it would be just since
the issue is one of obeying the authorities in order to have a pure soul. It was in
regard to this problem that Vitoria provides his example of invincible ignorance,
by which he means that one’s soul is safe even if one commits an act of sin,
provided that this person did everything possible to learn the truth, but since one
cannot know everything it is often suﬃcient for one’s soul to obey the proper
authorities and thus act according to the law.74 Aside from this issue, which gets
us back to the problem of resistance (and it may be that the strongest argument
for justifying the obligation to die would be to ask whether or not the obligation
should be resisted), there is the additional problem of how the just war tenets
would be used in justifying the obligation to die. Just war is not a shopping list,
and so the application of just war tenets to the obligation to die would have to
match the way that the tradition is used, assuming that one is comfortable with the
tradition and its usage. There is such a vast amount of scholarship on this regard
that repetition here is both unnecessary and would inevitably be grossly insuﬃ-
cient. It is worth noting, however, that George Kateb suggests that one condition
for the obligation to be just is for the obligation to arise in relation to a war of
self-defence.75 Nevertheless, it may be worth thinking about the way that just war
theory is used, and how the ethics of and in war could contribute to justifying the
obligation to die.
73 It is both noteworthy and curious that in his review of Just and Unjust Wars, Hedley Bull
commented that Walzer’s research on the just war needed and suggested further work on the topic
of political obligation. It is noteworthy because Bull rightly spotted an important and unaddressed
side to the ethics of war, but it is curious because Walzer had already written his essay on the
obligation to die. See, Hedley Bull, ‘Recapturing the Just War for Political Theory’, World Politics,
31:4 (1979).
74 Vitoria, Political Writings.
75 George Kateb, The Inner Ocean: Individualism and Democratic Culture (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1992), p. 183.
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Conclusion
The problem posed by the obligation to die can be summed up with the following
example. In the 18th Century, the English jurist William Blackstone wrote that, ‘In
free states [. . .] no man should take up arms, but with a view to defend his country
and its laws; he puts not oﬀ the citizen when he enters the camp; but it is because
he is a citizen, and would wish to continue to do so, that he makes himself for a
while a soldier.’76 However, Blackstone’s optimism was not met with reality, for in
England (and elsewhere) in the late 18th Century there was widespread public
opposition and resistance, including riots, to serving in the military.77
By the 20th Century the situation had changed and there was no such problem
in conscripting soldiers, as demonstrated by two World Wars. Due partly to this
unparalleled ability to conscript citizens into ﬁghting and dying for the state, but
also from changes in international law that did not question the authority of the
state, attempts in the 20th Century to justify the obligation to die diminished
signiﬁcantly. The state had, so it seemed, managed to consolidate its authority and
could conscript with legal, moral and political impunity. Nevertheless, the problem
of the obligation to die brieﬂy resurfaced in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. As
in Blackstone’s day, the contrast in opinion and reality resurfaced, albeit with a
modiﬁcation, for it was no longer obvious that the citizen would wish to make
himself or herself a soldier even while the state could count on the majority of
citizens being obliged into military service. In either example, the obligation to die
is a problem.
This article is one attempt to broaden our understanding of the ethics of war,
to blur the divide between the political philosophy that lies behind ethics of war
theory and its applied ethical side, to suggest some questions that should animate
future research on ethics and war, and possibly revive or open up some of the
tenets in the just war tradition. In addressing the moral problem of the obligation
to die, it becomes evident that a full application of just war theory needs to go
back and take into account the philosophical claims that characterise the tenets of
the just war tradition. While many just war texts do this, the contemporary divorce
between the morality of killing and the morality of death nevertheless exists as a
result of taking for granted the philosophical assumptions that lie behind the ius
ad bellum tenet of proper authority. While there may be good reasons for the
historical shift of attention away from the problem of proper authority and the
subsequent issue of being obligated into war, the problem of being obliged to risk
one’s life for the state by being sent into war is a problem that has and should
continue to inﬂuence our understanding and use of the ethics of war and just war
theory. This problem should continue to be of interest not only because the
question of dying is the other side of the moral coin about killing in war, but
because it is a serious moral issue in its own right.
76 Peter Paret, Understanding War: Essays on Clausewitz and the History of Military Power (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 40.
77 Paret, Understanding War.
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